Document tampering : When proof becomes immediately required
This note does not prescribe operational steps. It describes a recurrent institutional mechanism : Once a document is suspected of alteration, the primary issue is no longer “Content” but “Proof”.
Cold definition
A document is considered “tampered with” whenever there is a serious doubt regarding one of these three dimensions : Origin (Who issued it), Integrity (Whether it has changed), or Continuity (Which version is authoritative, at what date, and in which context). The suspicion may be correct or incorrect; institutionally, the mere doubt is enough to trigger a proof requirement.
When the risk becomes visible
- A “Version A” circulates while “Version B” is already in use ;
- A signature is disputed (Scan/copy, missing signing context, missing traceability) ;
- A decision depends on the document (Audit, dispute, control, external recognition) ;
- An external authority requires immediate justification (Origin, date, custody/continuity).
What is usually done (And why it may not be sufficient)
The most common reaction is to produce a new copy, a “Clearer scan”, an explanatory email, or an internal attestation. These actions can help clarify, but they do not replace a proof continuity that was already stabilized at the time of use.
Structural point : In a crisis, the question is not “Who claims the truth”, but “What can be demonstrated”.
What becomes required in institutional contexts
Once a document produces an effect (Decision, liability, right, payment, recognition), three requirements recur systematically :
- Origin: Ability to establish issuer, channel, and issuance context ;
- Integrity: Ability to establish absence of unauthorized change, or a verifiable change history ;
- Continuity: Ability to establish version succession and the moment each version was authoritative.
Cold rule : Proof is not retroactive. The longer a system waits, the higher the reconstruction cost.
Frequent mistake : Confusing “Format” with “Proof”
A PDF, a scan, a photo, or a printout are formats. They can be necessary to transmit information, but they do not by themselves establish origin, integrity, and continuity. In a crisis, what is required is not a better file, but a stronger demonstration.
Neutral exit
This situation illustrates a simple mechanism : A document becomes a risk when operational use exceeds available proof capacity. At that point, the question is no longer only technical; it becomes structural.